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Abstract
In applied game theory the motivation of players is a key element. It
is encoded in the payoffs of the game form and often based on utility func-
tions. But there are cases were formal descriptions in the form of a utility
function do not exist. In this paper we introduce a representation of games
where players’ goals are modeled based on so-called higher-order functions.
Our representation provides a general and powerful way to mathematically
summarize players’ intentions. In our framework utility functions as well as
preference relations are special cases to describe players’ goals. We show
that in higher-order functions formal descriptions of players may still exist
where utility functions do not using a classical example, a variant of Keynes’
beauty contest. We also show that equilibrium conditions based on Nash
can be easily adapted to our framework. Lastly, this framework serves as a
stepping stone to powerful tools from computer science that can be usefully
applied to economic game theory in the future such as computational and
computability aspects.
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1 Introduction
A key ingredient of game theory is the motivation or goal of each individ-
ual player. The standard approach is to encode the goal of the player in
the payoffs assigned to the different outcomes of the interaction. These pay-
offs, in turn, are often based on utility functions, as for instance in political
economics where a politician maximizes his vote share, or in industrial or-
ganization where a company maximizes profits. Yet, not all motivations can
be summarized easily or in the most insightful way by utility functions.
Consider the following example of a variant of Keynes’ beauty contest [7].
There are three players, the judges J = {J1, J2, J3}. Each judge simultane-
ously votes for one of two contestants, A or B. The winner is determined by
the simple majority rule of type maj : X ×X ×X → X , where X = {A,B}.
Note that X in this case is both the set of possible choices for the three
judges and the space of possible outcomes.
Suppose that J1 prefers A over B. Judges 2 and 3, in contrast, are not
interested in the outcomes per se but only in voting for the winner of the
contest. As long as the winning contestant is the one they voted for they are
happy. How would we describe such a game? In particular, how would we
assign payoffs to the outcomes of the contest? There are only two possible
results: either A wins or B wins. Obviously, these outcomes do not contain
sufficient information to model the payoffs of players 2 and 3, as both judges
do not care about A or B but only whether there is a majority for the
candidate they have voted for.
One solution is to consider an extended outcome space, i.e. the complete
voting profile of all players. Then, judge 2 and 3 prefer profiles where they
are in the majority over profiles where they are in the minority. Table 1
depicts the payoff matrix that represents this game.
A B
A 1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
B 1, 1, 1 0, 1, 0
A
A B
A 1, 1, 0 0, 1, 1
B 0, 0, 1 0, 1, 1
B
Table 1: Voting Contest
The crucial point is that all the individual outcomes have to be ranked
by hand and payoffs are assigned accordingly. The goals of the three players
are implicitly encoded in the payoffs. A succinct formal summary of goals
like a utility function is not provided.
Now, ranking the extended outcome space is simple and fast in this ex-
ample. But what if we considered a game consisting of 5 players or 20 players
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with players having various goals? Calculating the payoffs will become com-
plicated, slow or error prone. More importantly, interpreting (or decoding)
the outcome of such a game in terms of the original motivation becomes
complicated.
In this paper we introduce a representation of games that formally sum-
marizes the goals of agents, such as in the beauty contest described above,
in a general and powerful way. Our approach builds on higher-order func-
tions (also called functionals or operators) and originates in game-theoretic
approaches to proof theory [2, 1].
The core concept is that we model players’ goals as quantifiers, i.e. higher-
order functions of type (X → R) → R, that take functions from the space
X → R as an argument, where X is the set of choices and R is the set of
possible outcomes. A corresponding notion is that of a selection function,
i.e. a higher-order function of type (X → R)→ X . If we think of functions
of type X → R as a game context, then quantifiers map game contexts to
preferred outcomes, while selection functions map game contexts to preferred
moves.
The operators normally used in game theory are examples of quantifiers
and selection functions of a particular type. They are the max: (X → R)→
R and argmax: (X → R)→ X operators.
One point of view is that our approach generalizes these operators, and
allows the use of different operators to model players, i.e. we can describe
behavior in terms of operators other than max. Moreover, the outcome space
in our formulation of goals can have any structure and is not restricted in
order to be representable by rational preferences1.
But most importantly, since quantifiers and selection functions take func-
tions as input, context-dependent goals about the interaction itself, as in the
Keynes example, can be easily described. For instance, in the case of the
voting contest, judges 2 and 3 can be directly summarized as a fixed point
operator on the outcome function. It is this flexibility of our approach that
allows for a high-level description of individual goals in games.
Economic situations often encompass high-level goals. Consider, for in-
stance, coordination or differentiation. Typically, we would translate these
goals into numerical payoffs. While in some situations payoffs may be a nat-
ural representation of the original goals, in other cases this translation blurs
the properties of the outcomes and alternatives to decide upon and thereby
obfuscates the actual motivations of the players. By using quantifiers and
1In a companion paper [6] where we focus on decision problems, we give a detailed
description in which way quantifiers and selection functions are a common structure shared
by utility maximization, preference relations as well as behavioral approaches.
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selection functions we gain a more expressive description that is closer to the
economic situation we want to encode as well as easier to adapt to alternative
specifications of the game.
We will also show that the standard Nash equilibrium concept can be
seamlessly generalized to our higher-order representation of games. Based
on Nash, we introduce the quantifier and selection equilibrium concepts. We
prove that quantifier and selection equilibria coincide in the case of the classi-
cal max and argmax operators, but that, generally, this equivalence does not
hold: For other quantifiers and selection functions the two different equilib-
rium concepts yield different sets of equilibria. We give a sufficient condition
for the two notions to coincide based on the notion of closedness of selection
functions. We prove that in general, the selection equilibrium is an equilib-
rium refinement of the quantifier equilibrium, and present evidence that for
games based on non-closed selection functions, the selection equilibrium is
the appropriate solution concept (Section 5.2).
We consider several variants of the voting contest introduced above in
order to acquaint the reader with our tools. We also provide several text-
book examples such as the Battle of the Sexes, and show that the underlying
structure of such examples is accurately represented in this higher-order set-
ting.
In this paper we restrict ourselves to simple models in order to highlight
the features of our framework. As there are an infinite number of higher-
order functions like the max operator, we can only peek into the additional
possibilities of higher-order functions and leave the applications for future
research.
2 Players, Quantifiers and Selection Functions
A higher order function (or functional) is a function whose domain is itself
a set of functions. Given sets X and Y we denote by X → Y the set of
all functions with domain X and codomain Y . A higher order function is
therefore a function f : (X → Y )→ Z where X , Y and Z are sets.
Example 2.1. There are familiar examples of higher-order functions in eco-
nomics. The max operator has type
max: (X → R)→ R
returning the maximum value of a given real-valued function p : X → R.
One will normally write max p as maxx∈X p(x). A corresponding operator is
argmax which returns all the points where the maximum is attained, i.e.
argmax: (X → R)→ P(X)
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using P(X) for the power-set of X. As opposed to max, argmax is naturally
a multi-valued function. Integration has a similar type to max∫
: (X → R)→ R
except that one will only consider measurable sets X, and
∫
p is normally
written as
∫
p(x)dx. Of a slightly different nature is the fixed point operator
fix: (X → X)→ P(X)
which calculates all the fixed points of a given self-mapping p : X → X, or the
anti-fixed-point operator which calculates all points that are not fixed points.
In this section we define two particular classes of higher-order functions:
quantifiers and selection functions. We first establish that these functions
provide means to represent agents’ goals in an abstract and general way. In
particular, these notions usefully generalize utility maximization and prefer-
ence relations.
2.1 Game Context
To define players’ goals we first need a structure that represents the economic
situation on which these goals are based. For this end we introduce the
concept of a game context which summarizes information of the strategic
situation from the perspective of a single player.
Definition 2.2 (Game context). For a player A choosing a move from a set
X, having in sight a final outcome in a set R, we call any function p : X → R
a possible game context for the player A.
Assuming that the player A is deterministic (or predictable) in the sense
that his moves are not dependent on chance2 We can think of functions
p : X → R as representing any economic situation or context we can put the
player into. A player’s goals will be defined on such functions.
Example 2.3. Consider our first example from the Introduction: three judges
are voting simultaneously for one of two contestants X = {A,B}. The win-
ner is decided by the majority rule maj : X×X×X → X. In a setting where
judges 1 and 3 have fixed their choices, say x1 = A and x3 = B, this gives
rise to a game context for the second judge, namely
x2 7→ maj(A, x2, B)
2This is without loss of generality, because we can always allow the set of outcomes to
be a set of probability distributions.
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which is in fact the identity function since maj(A, x2, B) = x2. If, on the
other hand, judges 1 and 3 had fixed their choices as x1 = x3 = A, the game
context for player 2 would be the constant function x2 7→ A, since his vote
does not influence the outcome.
One can think of the game context p : X → R as an abstraction of the
actual game context that is determined by knowing the rules of the game,
and how each opponent played. Notice that in the example above the game
context which maps A to B, and B to A, never arises. It would arise,
however, if one replaced the majority rule by the minority one. The lesson
here is that several concrete contexts can give rise to the same abstract game
context, and there might abstract game contexts that do not arise in a given
particular game.
It might seem like we are losing too much information by adopting such
an abstraction of a game context. What we wish to illustrate through several
examples is that such a level of abstraction is sufficient for modeling players’
individual motivations and goals. And precisely because it is abstract and it
captures the strategic context of a player as if it was a single decision problem,
it allows for a description of the players’ intrinsic motivations, irrespective of
how many players are around, or which particular game is being played.
2.2 Quantifiers and Selection Functions
Suppose now that A makes a decision x ∈ X in a game context p : X → R.
The player will consider some outcomes to be good (or acceptable), and other
outcomes to be bad. In general, we are going to allow the set of outcomes
that the player considers good to be totally arbitrary.
Definition 2.4 (Quantifiers, [1, 2]). Let P(R) denote the power-set of the
set of outcomes R. Higher-order functions
ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R)
from contexts p : X → R to sets of outcomes ϕ(p) ⊆ R are called quantifiers3.
We wish to model players A as quantifiers ϕA : (X → R) → P(R). We
think of ϕ(p) as the set of outcomes the player A considers preferable in
a given game context p : X → R. It is crucial to recognize that this is a
3The terminology comes from the observation that the usual existential ∃ and universal
∀ quantifiers of logic can be seen as operations of type (X → B)→ B, where B is the type of
booleans. Mostowski [9] also called arbitrary functionals of type (X → B)→ B generalized
quantifiers. We are choosing to generalize this further by replacing the booleans B with
an arbitrary type R, and allowing for the operation to be multi-valued.
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qualitative description of a player, in the sense that an outcome is either
preferable or it is not, with no numerical measure attached.
The classical example of a quantifier is utility maximisation, with the
outcome set R = Rn consisting of n-tuples of real-valued payoffs. If we
denote by pii : R
n → R the i-projection, then the utility of the ith player is
pii(r). Hence, given a game context p : X → R
n, the good outcomes for the
ith player are precisely those for which the ith coordinate, i.e. his utility, is
maximal. This quantifier is given by
i-max(p) = {r ∈ Im(p) | ri ≥ (pii ◦ p)(x
′) for all x′ ∈ X}
where Im(p) denotes the image of the function p : X → R, and pii ◦ p denotes
the composition of p with the i-th projection.
Analogously to utility maximization, players’ choices motivated by prefer-
ence relations can also be easily represented. Suppose R is the set of possible
final outcomes, the context p : X → R maps actions to outcomes, and a
player i has a total order relation i on R, so that x i y means that player
i prefers the outcome x to y. This quantifier is given by:
i-max(p) = {r ∈ Im(p) | r i p(x
′) for all x′ ∈ X}
Just as a quantifier tells us which outcomes a player considers good in each
given context, one can also consider the higher-order function that determines
which moves a player considers good in any given context.
Definition 2.5 (Selection functions). A selection function is any function
of the form4
ε : (X → R)→ P(X).
Similarly to quantifiers, the canonical example of a selection function is
maximising one of the coordinates in Rn, defined by
i-argmax(p) = {x ∈ X | (pii ◦ p)(x) ≥ (pii ◦ p)(x
′) for all x′ ∈ X}.
Even in one-dimensional R1 the argmax selection function is naturally multi-
valued: a function may attain its maximum value at several different points.
4In the computer science literature where selection functions have been considered pre-
viously [1, 2] the focus was on single-valued ones. However, as multi-valued selection
functions are extremely important in our examples we have adapted the definitions ac-
cordingly.
7
2.3 Closed Selection Functions
The selection function one obtains from utility functions and preference rela-
tions in the previous subsection are examples of what we call closed selection
functions.
Definition 2.6 (Closedness). A selection function ε : (X → R)→ P(X) is
said to be closed if whenever x ∈ ε(p) and p(x) = p(x′) then x′ ∈ ε(p).
Intuitively, a closed selection function is one which chooses optimal moves
only based on the outcomes they generate. Two moves that lead to the same
outcome are therefore indistinguishable, they are either both good or bad.
It is easy to see that the selection function argmax(p) is closed. Agents
modelled via closed selection functions do not put any preferences on moves
that lead to identical outcomes.
An example of non-closed selection function is the fixpoint operator
fix : (X → X)→ P(X).
Recall that a fixpoint of a function f : X → X is a point x ∈ X satisfying
f(x) = x. When the set of moves is equal to the set of outcomes R = X there
is a selection function whose good moves are precisely the fixpoints of the
context. If the context has no fixpoint then the player will be equally satisfied
with any outcome. Therefore such a selection function can be defined as
fix(p) =
{
{x ∈ X | p(x) = x} if p(x) = x for some x ∈ X
X otherwise
Clearly fix(·) is non-closed, since we might have two points x and x′ which
both map to x (i.e. p(x) = p(x′) = x) so that x is a fixed point but x′ might
not be. We will see in Section 3.1 that such a fixpoint selection function
perfectly models the agent in the Keynesian beauty contest whose sole goal
is to vote for the winner.
2.4 Relating Quantifiers and Selection Functions
It is clear that quantifiers and selection functions are closely related. One
important relation between them is that of attainment. Intuitively this means
that the outcome of a good move should be a good outcome.
Definition 2.7. Given a quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R) and a selection
function ε : (X → R) → P(X), we say that ε attains ϕ iff for all contexts
p : X → R it is the case that
x ∈ ε(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ ϕ(p).
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One can check that the attainability relation holds between the quantifier
i-max and the selection function i-argmax. Any point where the maximum
valued is attained will evaluate to the maximum value of the function. More
interestingly, the fixpoint quantifier is also a selection function, and it attains
itself since
x ∈ fix(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ fix(p).
Let us briefly reflect on the game theoretic meaning of attainability. Sup-
pose we have a quantifier ϕ which describes the outcomes that a player
considers to be good. The quantifier might be unrealistic in the sense that
it has no attainable good outcome. For example, a player may consider it a
good outcome if he received a million dollars, but in his current context there
may just not be a move available which will lead to this outcome. Given a
context p, the set of attainable outcomes is precisely the image of p.
Given any selection function ε : (X → R) → P(X), we can form the
smallest quantifier which it attains as follows.
Definition 2.8. Given a selection function ε : (X → R)→ P(X), define the
quantifier ε : (X → R)→ P(R) as
ε(p) = {p(x) | x ∈ ε(p)}.
Conversely, given any quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R) we can define a
corresponding selection function as follows.
Definition 2.9. Given a quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R), define the selec-
tion function ϕ : (X → R)→ P(X) as
ϕ(p) = {x | p(x) ∈ ϕ(p)}.
We use the same overline notation, as it will be clear from the setting
whether we are applying it to a quantifier or a selection function. One can
consider translating quantifiers into selection functions and back into quan-
tifiers, or conversely.
Proposition 2.10. For all p : X → R we have ϕ(p) = ϕ(p) and ε(p) ⊆ ε(p).
Proof. These are easy to derive. Let us briefly outline ε(p) ⊆ ε(p). Suppose
x ∈ ε(p) is a good move in the game context p : X → R. By Definition 2.8
we have that p(x) ∈ ε(p). Finally, by Definition 2.9 we have that x ∈ ε(p). 
The proposition above shows that on quantifiers the double-overline op-
eration calculates the same quantifier we started with. However, on selection
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functions the mapping ε 7→ ε can be viewed as a closure operator5. Intu-
itively, the new selection function ε will have the same good outcomes as the
original one, but it might consider many more moves to be good as well, as
it does not distinguish moves which both lead to equally good outcomes.
Proposition 2.11. A selection function ε is closed if and only if ε = ε.
Proof. Assume first that ε is closed, i.e.
(i) x ∈ ε(p) and p(x) = p(x′) then x′ ∈ ε(p).
By Proposition 2.10 is it enough to show that if x′ ∈ ε(p) then x′ ∈ ε(p).
Assuming x′ ∈ ε(p), and by Definition 2.9 we have
(ii) p(x′) ∈ ε(p).
By Definition 2.8, (ii) says that p(x′) = p(x) for some x ∈ ε(p). By (i) it
follows that x ∈ ε(p).
Conversely, assume that ε = ε and that x ∈ ε(p) and p(x) = p(x′). We
wish to show that x′ ∈ ε(p). Since x ∈ ε(p) then p(x) ∈ ε(p). But since
p(x) = p(x′) we have that p(x′) ∈ ε(p). Hence, x′ ∈ ε(p). But since ε = ε it
follows that x′ ∈ ε(p).
Remark 2.12. The theory of quantifiers and selection functions has been
developed in stages. Single-valued selection functions and quantifiers in the
general form used here first appeared in [1], unifying earlier definitions in
proof theory and type theory. That is also where the connection between
selection functions and game theory was first established. Multi-valued quan-
tifiers appeared in [2], which allows us to capture more important examples in
a more natural way. The connections between selection functions and game
theory were explored in more depth in [3] and [4], and the latter contains
the definition of attainment given here. Finally [5] contains the terminology
context.
3 Higher-Order Games
Quantifiers and selection functions as introduced in the previous section can
be used to model games. In this section we define higher-order games. In
the next section we introduce suitable equilibrium concepts.
5Note that we might have a strict inclusion ε(p) ⊂ ε(p) in case we have x1 6= x2, with
x1 ∈ ε(p) and x2 6∈ ε(p) but p(x1) = p(x2).
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Definition 3.1 (Higher-Order Games). An n-players game G, with a set
R of outcomes and sets Xi of strategies for the i
th player, consists of an
(n + 1)-tuple G = (ε1, . . . , εn, q) where
• for each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, εi : (Xi → R) → P(Xi) is a selection func-
tion describing the i-th player’s preferred moves in each game context.
• q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R is the outcome function, i.e., a mapping from the
strategy profile to the final outcome.
Intuitively, we think of the outcome function q as representing the ‘sit-
uation’, or the rules of the game, while we think of the selection functions
as describing the players. Thus we can imagine the same player in different
situations, and different players in the same situation. This allows us to de-
compose a modelling problem into a global and a local part: modelling the
situation and modelling the players.
Remark 3.2 (Classical Game [10]). The ordinary definition of a normal
form game of n-players with standard payoff functions is a particular case of
Definition 3.1 when
• for each player i the set of strategies is Xi,
• the set of outcomes R is Rn, modelling the vector of payoffs obtained
by each player,
• the selection function of player i is i-argmax: (Xi → R
n) → P(Xi),
i.e. argmax with respect to the ith coordinate, representing the idea
that each player is solely interested in maximising their own payoff,
• the ith component of the outcome function q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n can be
viewed as the payoff function qi :
∏n
j=1Xj → R of the i
th player.
3.1 Keynesian Beauty Contest
Consider the following voting contest as already outlined in the introduction.
Example 3.3 (The voting contest). There are three players, the judges J =
{J1, J2, J3}, who each vote for one of two contestants A or B. The winner
is determined by the simple majority rule.
We analyse two instances of this game with different motivations of play-
ers while keeping the overall structure of the game fixed.
11
Classical game. First suppose that the judges rank the contestants ac-
cording to a preference ordering. For example, say that judges 1 and 2 prefer
A and judge 3 prefers B. Table 3.1 depicts a payoff matrix which encodes
this situation, including the rules for choosing a player (majority) and the
goals of each individual player.
A B
A 1, 1, 0 1, 1, 0
B 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
A
A B
A 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
B 0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1
B
Table 2: Voting Contest
Let us now see how such a game would be modelled following Definition
3.1. The set of strategies in this case is the same as the set of possible
outcomes, i.e. Xi = R = {A,B}. The outcome function q : X1×X2×X3 → R
is nothing more than the majority function maj : X × X × X → X , e.g.
maj(A,B,B) = B. It remains for us to find suitable selection functions
representing the goals of the three players. Consider two order relations on
X , call it B ′ A and A ′′ B. It is clear that in this case the judges wish to
maximise the final outcome with respect to their preferred ordering. Hence
we have that the three selection functions should be
ε1(p) = ε2(p) = 
′-argmax
ε3(p) = 
′′-argmax .
Therefore, the game above would be fully described by the tuple of higher-
order functionals
G = (′-argmax,′-argmax,′′-argmax,maj).
The Keynesian variant. Let us now reconsider the beauty contest from
the introduction. The first judge J1 still ranks the candidates according to
a preference ordering B  A. The second and third judges, however, have
no preference relations over the candidates per se, but want to vote for the
winning candidate. They are Keynesian players!
As shown in the introduction, it is perfectly possible to model such game
via standard payoff matrices, and Table 3.1 presents such an encoding. If
there is a majority for a candidate and player J2 or J3 vote for the majority
candidate they will get a certain utility, say 1. If they vote for another
candidate, their utility is lower, say 0.
Note, however, that in the process of attaching utilities to the strategies,
one has to compute the outcome of the votes, then check for the second and
12
A B
A 1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
B 1, 1, 1 0, 1, 0
A
A B
A 1, 1, 0 0, 1, 1
B 0, 0, 1 0, 1, 1
B
Table 3: Voting Contest
the third player whether their vote is in line with the outcome, and finally
attach the utilities.
Let us now contrast this with the higher-order modelling of games. First
note that from the game G of the previous example, only the “motivation”
of players 2 and 3 have changed. Accordingly, we will only need to adjust
their selection functions so as to capture their new goal which is to vote for
the winner of the contest. Such goal is exactly captured by equipping J2
and J3 with the fixpoint selection function fix : (X → X) → P(X), defined
in Section 2.2. Note that it is neither necessary to change the structure of
the game nor to manually compute anything. The new game with the two
Keynesian judges is directly described by the tuple
GK = (-argmax, fix, fix,maj).
One can say that in the higher-order modelling of games we have equipped the
individual players themselves with the problem solving ability that we used
to compute the payoff matrices such that they represent the motivations of
the Keynesian players. These fixpoint agents with their computational power
resemble a construction that is at the core of the Lucas critique.6
3.2 Meeting in New York
Consider now the game where two strangers, call them 1 and 2, want to
meet in New York. Suppose there are two places which they consider as
meeting points, Grand Central Terminal (G) and the Empire State Building
(E). Both players have to choose simultaneously, and they would only be
happy if they pick the same meeting place. Table 3.2 depicts a payoff matrix
representing this game [12, 8].
Notice that the original motivation of the players that is encoded in the
numerical payoffs above is actually qualitative: Their only goal is to coor-
6Sargent [11] describes the need for a similarity of the economist and the economically
reasoning agents in the economists’ models as follows: “[t]he idea of rational expecta-
tions is ... said to embody the idea that economists and the agents they are modeling
should be placed on the equal footing: the agents in the model should be able to forecast
and profit-maximize and utility-maximize as well as the economist -or should we say the
econometrician - who constructed the model.”
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Strategy E G
E 1,1 0,0
G 0,0 1,1
Table 4: Meeting in New York
dinate. Numeric values such as 1 and 0 encode whether they succeed or
not.
Let us consider a possible higher-order modelling of such game and see
how it is able to directly express the motivation of the players. Let C =
{E,G} be the set of choices. To begin with, the strategy spaces of the two
players are X1 = X2 = C. As the set of outcomes let us take the possible
locations that the two players chose, i.e. R = C × C, so an element of R
is a pair where the first coordinate tells what the first player chose, and
the second tells what the second player chose. Now the outcome function
q : X1 ×X2 → R is simply the identity function id : C × C → C × C.
Finally, to model the coordination goals of both player we can use a
variant of the fixed point selection function fixi : (C → C × C)→ P(C), for
i ∈ {1, 2}, defined as
fixi(p) =
{
{x ∈ X | (pii ◦ p)(x) = x} if (pii ◦ p)(x) = x for some x ∈ X
X otherwise.
The game then has a higher-order description as the triple GNY = (fix2, fix1, id).
3.3 Matching Pennies
Two players, call them 1 and 2, play by hiding a penny in their hand. Each
player secretly turns the penny such that heads (H) or tails (T ) is facing
up. Then, both players simultaneously reveal their penny. The two players’
payoffs are such that player 1 wins if both pennies match, player 2 wins if
they do not match. In this game there is a clear quantitative interpretation
of payoffs: the player who loses gives his penny to the winner. Hence, the
winner gains one penny while the other player loses one penny. Table 5 shows
how such a game would be normally encoded into a payoff matrix.
Payoffs thus characterise the monetary gains and losses of players. Ac-
cording to this interpretation the numerical payoffs come very natural. But
there are also alternative interpretations of this game, such as penalty kicks
in soccer, where the payoffs just capture qualitative information about who
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Strategy H T
H 1,-1 -1,1
T -1,1 1,-1
Table 5: Matching Pennies
loses and who wins. In this case what we want to model as the players’ goals
is coordination and differentiation, respectively.
Let us see how to model this in the higher-order game framework. Note
that the first player wants to coordinate with the second player whereas the
second player wants to differentiate from player 1. Similarly to Meeting in
New York, player 1 can be modelled with a fixed point selection function.
We let the set of outcomes be R = X1 × X2 = {H, T}
2, representing the
actual choice made by the two players. Again the outcome function is the
identity function:
q(x1, x2) = id(x1, x2) = (x1, x2).
As in the previous example, the first player, who wishes to coordinate the
moves, is best modelled by the fixed point selection function
fix(p) = {x1 ∈ X1 | x1 = pi2(p(x1))}.
Just as the fixpoint selection function models coordination, so there is a ‘non-
fixpoint’ selection function which models differentiation or anti-coordination.
The set of non-fixpoints in this game is
non-fix(p) = {x2 ∈ X2 | x2 6= pi1(p(x2))}.
So the whole game is modelled by the triple of higher order functions
GMP = (fix, non-fix, id).
Coordination and anti-coordination are motifs that play an important
role in general. Often, as for instance in the Game of Chicken, the situation
we actually want to represent is qualitative. Fixpoints and non-fixpoints are
a high-level description of such motivations.
3.4 Battle of the Sexes
A couple has agreed to meet but they do not agree whether they should
be attending the ballet (B) or a football match (F ). As far as individual
preferences go, the husband prefers football over ballet, while the wife prefers
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Strategy B F
B 3,2 1,1
F 0,0 2,3
Table 6: Battle of the Sexes
ballet over football. But irrespective of their personal preferences, they would
of course rather be together than by themselves in two different places. The
set of strategies contain the two possible choices they can make Xh = Xw =
{B,F}. This is a variant of the classical Battle of the Sexes game. It is
normally modelled as having an outcome R = R×R capturing the utility of
the husband and wife after their individual choices are made. This game is
represented via the payoff matrix of Table 6.
In the classical representation, both players maximise their corresponding
coordinate of the outcome tuple (rw, rh) ∈ R × R, i.e. the wife wants to
maximise rw whereas the husband would like to maximise rh.
Let us again consider an alternative modelling of the game using selection
functions. The choices of moves are still Xw = Xh = {B,F}, but now we
take as the set of outcomes a description of what actually happens, namely,
who goes to which event. We set R = Xw ×Xh = {B,F} × {B,F}. Hence,
an element of R is a pair where the first coordinate denotes the choice of
the wife and the second coordinate denotes the choice of the husband. Here
again, we can take the outcome function q : Xw×Xh → R to be the identity
function.
We will build the selection functions for each player in a compositional
way, by observing that each player has a lexicographic preference: their first
priority is to be coordinated, and all else being equal, their second priority is
to go to their favourite event (be it ballet or football). We describe an element
of R as coordinated if its first coordinate equals its second coordinate, so the
coordinated outcomes in this game are (B,B) and (F, F ). We can define
a selection function εc which chooses all moves that lead to a coordinated
outcome as follows:
εc(p) = {x | (pi1 ◦ p)(x) = (pi2 ◦ p)(x)}).
Next we have a pair of selection functions εb, εf representing the purely selfish
aims of attending ballet and football respectively:
εB(p) = {x | (pi1 ◦ p)(x) = B}
εF (p) = {x | (pi2 ◦ p)(x) = F}
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We are now ready to build our players’ selection functions compositionally.
Given a context, the joint selection function checks whether there are any
moves which satisfy both personalities given by the coordinating and selfish
selection functions. If so, the joint selection function returns those moves. If
there are no moves satisfying both then the coordination takes priority, and
the selfish aspect is ignored. Therefore the wife’s selection function is
εw(p) =
{
εc(p) ∩ εB(p) if nonempty
εc(p) otherwise
and the husband’s selection function is
εh(p) =
{
εc(p) ∩ εF (p) if nonempty
εc(p) otherwise
The whole game is then fully described by the triple G = (εw, εh, id).
Observe that in building these selection functions we have not made use
of the assumption that the game’s outcome function is the identity function.
The selection functions will still describe the intrinsic motivations of the
players even if we change the rules of the game. For example, say that the
couple have an agreement that if the husband ever goes to the football match
and the wife is not there, then he has to make his way to the ballet instead
and meet her there. That changes the outcome function of the game as
q(xw, xh) =
{
(xw, B) if xw = B and xh = F
(xw, xh) otherwise.
This new game is modelled by the triple G = (εw, εh, q).
Although this is a trivial example, we believe that this method of mod-
elling will distinguish itself in its ability to scale easily to very complex sit-
uations. A realistic player may have many competing aims, some of these
might be best modelled by closed or non-closed selection functions (for ex-
ample immediate profit, long-term profit, fairness concerns, environmental
concerns). Using selection functions allows us to treat each aim individually,
and then afterwards combine them (with rules for breaking ties, such as the
lexicographic rule in this example) into a realistic description of the player.
4 Higher-Order Equilibria
In the following we turn to equilibrium concepts. We will introduce two
equilibrium definitions, one based on quantifiers and one based on selection
functions, both in the spirit of classical Nash equilibria.
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4.1 Quantifier Equilibrium
Consider a game with n players, and a strategy profile x ∈
∏n
i=1Xi. Given
an outcome function q : x ∈
∏n
i=1Xi → R, the game outcome resulting from
this choice of strategy profile is q(x). We can describe the game context in
which player i unilaterally changes his strategy as
U qi (x)(x
′
i) = q(x[i 7→ x
′
i])
where x[i 7→ x′i] is the tuple obtained from x by replacing the i
th entry of the
tuple x with x′i. Note that indeed U
q
i (x) has type Xi → R, the appropriate
type of a game context for player i.
We call the n functions U qi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) the unilateral maps of the game.
They were introduced in [4] in which it is shown that the proof of Nash’s the-
orem amounts to showing that the unilateral maps have certain topological
(continuity and closure) properties. The concept of a context was introduced
later in [5], so now we can say that U qi (x) : Xi → R is the game context
in which the ith player can unilaterally change his strategy, so we call it a
unilateral context.
Using this notation we can abstract the classical definition of Nash equi-
librium to our framework.
Definition 4.1 (Quantifier equilibrium). Given a game G = (ε1, . . . , εn, q),
we say that a strategy profile x ∈
∏n
i=1Xi is in quantifier equilibrium if
q(x) ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
for all players 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
As with the usual notion of Nash equilibrium, we are also saying that a
strategy profile is in quantifier equilibrium if no player has a motivation to
unilaterally change their strategy. This is expressed formally by saying that
preferred outcomes, specified by the selection function when applied to the
unilateral context, contain the outcome obtained by sticking with the current
strategy.
For illustration, we now want to give calculations of the quantifier equi-
libria for the voting contest game
G = (′-argmax,′-argmax,′′-argmax,maj).
as described in Section 3.1 in the notation of quantifiers and unilateral con-
texts. We look at two possible strategy profiles: BBB and BBA.
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We claim that BBB is in quantifier equilibrium. Note that BBB has
outcome maj(BBB) = B. Let us verify this for player 1. The unilateral
context of player 1 is
Umaj1 (BBB)(x) = maj(xBB) = B,
meaning that in the given context the outcome is B no matter what player
1 chooses to play. The maximisation quantifier applied to such a unilateral
context gives
ε1(U
maj
1 (BBB)) = 1-max(p)(U
maj
1 (BBB)) = {B},
meaning that, in the given context, player 1’s preferred outcome is B. Hence,
we can conclude by maj(BBB) = B ∈ {B} = ε1(U
maj
1 (BBB)(x)) that B is
a quantifier equilibrium strategy for player 1. This condition holds for each
player and allows us to conclude that BBB is a quantifier equilibrium.
On the other hand, we show that BBA is not in quantifier equilibrium.
We have that
maj(BBA) = B /∈ {A} = ε1(U
maj
1 (BBA)).
since Umaj1 (BBA)(x) = maj(xBA) = x. In other words, the strategy profile
BBA gives rise to a game context Umaj1 (BBA)(x) where player 1 has an
incentive to change his strategy to A, so that the new outcome maj(ABA) =
A is better than the previous outcome B.
This game has three quantifier equilibria: {AAA,AAB,BBB}. They are
exactly the same as the Nash equilibria in the normal form representation
(cf. Table 3.1). We will discuss this coincidence in more detail in Section
5.1.
4.2 Selection Equilibrium
The definition of quantifier equilibrium is based on quantifiers. However, we
can also use selection functions directly to define an equilibrium condition.
Definition 4.2 (Selection equilibrium). Given a game G = (ε1, . . . , εn, q),
we say that a strategy profile x ∈
∏n
i=1Xi is in selection equilibrium if
xi ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
for all players 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where xi is the i
th component of the tuple x.
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As in the previous subsection, let us illustrate the concept above using
our classical voting contest from Section 3.1. The set of selection equilibria
is {AAA,AAB,BBB}, the same as the set of quantifier equilibria. We will
give examples where the two notions differ in Section 5.2.
Consider BBB and the rationale for player 1. As seen above, his unilat-
eral context is
Umaj1 (BBB)(x) = maj(xBB) = B.
Hence, given this game context his selection function calculates
ε1(U
maj
1 (BBB)) = {B}
As before, given that he is not pivotal, an improvement by switching votes
is not possible. The same condition holds analogously for the other players.
Let us now investigate the strategy profile BBA. The unilateral context
is
Umaj1 (BBA)(x) = maj(xBA) = x.
Given this context, the selection function tells us that player 1 would switch
to A:
ε1(U
maj
1 (BBA)) = {A}.
Hence, BBA is not a selection equilibrium.
5 Relationship Between Equilibria
Our goal in this section is to show that selection equilibrium is a strict re-
finement of quantifier equilibrium. Moreover, we will show that for closed se-
lection functions the two notions coincide. The obvious question then arises:
which concept is more reasonable when games involve non-closed selection
functions? We will provide several examples based on the voting contest to
argue that in such cases selection equilibrium is the adequate concept.
5.1 Selection Refines Quantifier Equilibrium
Theorem 5.1. Every selection equilibrium is a quantifier equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that by definition, for every context p we have
x ∈ εi(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ εi(p)
since εi(p) = {p(x) | x ∈ εi(p)}. Assuming that x is a selection equilibrium
we have
xi ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
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Therefore
U qi (x)(xi) ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
It remains to note that U qi (x)(xi) = q(x), because x[i 7→ xi] = x.
However, for closed selection functions the two notions coincide:
Theorem 5.2. If εi = εi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then the two equilibrium concepts
coincide.
Proof. Given the previous theorem, it remains to show that under the as-
sumption εi = εi any strategy profile x in quantifier equilibrium is also in
selection equilibrium. Fix i and suppose x is such that
q(x) ∈ εi(U
q
i (x)).
Since U qi (x)(xi) = q(x), we have
U qi (x)(xi) ∈ εi(U
q
i (x)).
By the definition of εi it follows that
xi ∈ εi(U
q
i (x)).
Therefore, since εi = εi, we obtain xi ∈ εi(U
q
i (x)).
The theorem above explains why in all the examples from the last section
the strategy profiles that were quantifier equilibrium were the same as those
in selection equilibrium. All the examples can be modelled with closed se-
lection functions. Moreover, since argmax can be easily shown to be closed,
in the classical modelling of games via maximising players, our two notions
of equilibrium also coincide. The following theorem shows that they both
indeed also coincide with the standard notion of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.3. In a classical game (see Remark 3.2) the standard definition
of Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium notions of Definitions 4.1 and 4.2
are equivalent.
Proof. Suppose the set of outcomes R is Rn and that the selection functions
εi are i-argmax, i.e. maximising with respect to i
th coordinate. Unfolding
Definition 4.2 and that of a unilateral context U qi (x), we see that a tuple x
is an equilibrium strategy profile if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
xi ∈ i- argmax
x∈Xi
q(x[i 7→ x]).
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But xi is a point on which the function p(x) = q(x[i 7→ x]) attains its
maximum precisely when p(xi) ∈ maxx∈Xi p(x). Hence
q(x) = q(x[i 7→ xi]) = p(xi) = max
x∈Xi
p(x) = max
x∈Xi
q(x[i 7→ x])
which is the standard definition of a Nash equilibrium: for each player i, the
outcome obtained by not changing the strategy, i.e. q(x), is the best possible
amongst the outcomes when any other available strategy is considered, i.e.
maxx∈Xi q(x[i 7→ x]).
Theorem 5.3 above shows that in the case of classical games the usual con-
cept of a Nash equilibrium coincides with both the quantifier equilibrium and
the selection equilibrium. On the other hand, for general games, Theorem
5.1 proves that every selection equilibrium is a quantifier equilibrium
selection equilibria ( quantifier equilibria
In the following subsection we give several examples showing that the inclu-
sion above is strict, i.e. that there are games where selection equilibrium is a
strict refinement of quantifier equilibrium. By Theorem 5.2 these examples
necessarily make use of players modelled by non-closed selection functions.
5.2 Examples of Equilibria
Now we will explore the distinction between quantifier equilibria and selection
equilibria in more detail and we also relate it to the standard approach based
on Nash equilibria.
Keynesian beauty contest. We have discussed the representation of this
game both in normal form as well as in higher-order functions. Here, we will
turn to analyzing the equilibria of its higher-order representation
GK = (-argmax, fix, fix,maj).
from Section 3.1. We begin with quantifier equilibria (see Table 7). These
include the strategy profiles where players J2 and J3 are both coordinated
but also profiles where either J2 or J3 is in the minority.
We illustrate the rationale for the strategy profile AAB of the Keynesian
player 3. The outcome of AAB is maj(AAB) = A. The unilateral context
of player 3 is
Umaj3 (AAB)(x) = maj(AAx) = A
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meaning that the outcome is (still) A if player 3 unilaterally changes from B
to A. The fixed point quantifier applied to this context gives
ε3(U
maj
3 (AAB)) = fix(U
maj
3 (AAB)) = {A}
meaning that A is the outcome resulting from an optimal choice. Hence, we
can conclude by
maj(AAB) = A ∈ {A} = ε3(U
maj
3 (AAB))
that player 3 is happy with his choice of move B according to the quantifier
equilibrium notion. This already demonstrates the problem with the quan-
tifier equilibrium notion, since player 1 has voted for B but A is the winner,
so he should not be happy at all!
Now, let us turn to the selection equilibria. Table 7 also contains the
selection equilibria and it shows that they are a strict subset of the quantifier
equilibria.
Strategy Outcome Quantifier Eq. Defects Selection Eq. Defects
AAA A
AAB A - J3
ABA A - J2
ABB B
BAA A
BAB B - J1 - J1, J2
BBA B - J1 - J1, J3
BBB B
Table 7: Players: max, fix, fix
Consider again the strategy profile AAB, focusing on the third player. In
the case of the selection equilibrium we have
B /∈ {A} = fix(Umaj3 (AAB)) = ε3(U
maj
3 (AAB))
meaning that player 3 is not happy with his current choice of strategy B with
respect to the strategy profile AAB.
Remark 5.4. Given Theorem 5.2 it follows immediately that fix: (X →
X) → 2X is not a closed selection function. Indeed, it is easy to calculate
that
fix(p) = {x | p(x) = p(y), for some y such that y = p(y)},
i.e. fix(p) is the inverse image of fix(p), so it contains not only all fixed
points of p but also points that map through p to a fixed point.
23
A B
A 1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
B 1, 1, 1 0, 1, 0
A
A B
A 1, 1, 0 0, 1, 1
B 0, 0, 1 0, 1, 1
B
Table 8: Voting Contest
The selection equilibria are precisely those in which J2 and J3 are coor-
dinated, and J1 is not pivotal in any of these. For illustration, consider the
strategy AAA, which is a selection equilibrium of this game. Suppose the
moves of J1 and J2 are fixed, but J3 may unilaterally change strategy. The
unilateral context is
Umaj3 (AAA)(x) = maj(AAx) = A
Thus the unilateral context is a constant function, and its set of fixpoints is
fix(Umaj3 (AAA)) = {A}
This tells us that J3 has no incentive to unilaterally change to the strategy
B, because he will no longer be voting for the winner.
On the other hand, for the strategy ABB the two Keynesian players are
indifferent, because if either of them unilaterally changes to A then A will
become the majority and they will still be voting for the winner. This is still
a selection equilibrium (as we would expect) because the unilateral context
is the identity function, and in particular B is a fixpoint.
As a last point, let us compare the selection and quantifier equilibria of
Table 7 with the Nash equilibria in the normal form game. Table 8 reproduces
the payoff table; Nash equilibria payoffs are marked in bold. Note that the
latter are the same as selection equilibria.
The main message is that in the standard approach of modelling games
via payoff matrices, it may become necessary to calculate payoffs by hand
so as to model the given motivations of the player. In contrast, with selec-
tion functions, the goals of the player can be directly expressed without any
additional computation. And remarkably, the selection equilibria reproduce
exactly the economic intuition carried by the payoffs that we encoded by
hand.
Coordination and Anti-Coordination. In the Meeting in New York
as well as in the Matching Pennies examples, we have already seen that
the fixpoint selection functions nicely capture coordination motifs and the
anti-fixpoint function anti-coordination, respectively. Let us consider an-
other variant of the voting game to reassure that selection equilibrium is the
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adequate concept to capture our intuition when selection functions are not
closed.
We consider a game where all players want to vote for the winner of the
contest. Table 9 represents the payoffs of this game; Nash equilibria are in
bold. Clearly the only two equilibria are when all judges vote unanimously
for a given contestant. Judges J1, J2 and J3 want to vote for the winner, so
the selection functions are given by the fixpoint operator (X → X)→ P(X).
A B
A 1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
B 0, 1, 1 1, 1, 0
A
A B
A 1, 1, 0 0, 1, 1
B 1, 0, 1 1, 1, 1
B
Table 9: Voting Contest
As can be seen in Table 10, the selection equilibria are exactly the coor-
dinated strategies. This game is a good example of why quantifier equilibria
are not suitable for modelling games with non-closed selection functions: it
can be seen in the table that every strategy is a quantifier equilibrium of
this game, but the selection equilibrium captures the economic intuition per-
fectly that the equilibria should be the strategy profiles that are maximally
coordinated, namely AAA and BBB.
In a beauty contest, a player whose selection function is non-fixpoint is a
‘punk’ who aims to be in a minority. To conclude, let us consider the game
in which all three judges are punks (Table 11 represents the payoffs of this
game; Table 12 represents the equilibria in the higher-order representation).
Of course only one player can actually be in a minority, so the selection
equilibria are precisely the ‘maximally anti-coordinated’ strategy profiles,
namely those in which one judge differs from the other two. This is another
example of a game in which every strategy is a quantifier equilibrium, but
the selection equilibrium corresponds perfectly to our intuition.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced an alternative representation of games.
Quantifiers and selection functions provide an abstract and general way to
describe players’ goals. We have shown that, for instance in games of coor-
dination where payoffs are just implemented as a numerical representation
of qualitative goals, higher-order functions provide a more direct way of de-
scribing these goals. What is more higher order functions formally summarise
goals where utility functions do not exist - as exemplified by the Keynesian
Beauty contest.
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Strategy Outcome Quantifier Eq. Defects Selection Eq. Defects
AAA A
AAB A - J3
ABA A - J2
ABB B - J1
BAA A - J1
BAB B - J2
BBA B - J3
BBB B
Table 10: Players: fix, fix, fix
A B
A 0, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
B 1, 0, 0 0, 0, 1
A
A B
A 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0
B 1, 0, 1 0, 0, 0
B
Table 11: Voting Contest
Strategy Winner Nash Eq. Defects Selection Eq. Defects
AAA A - J1, J2, J3
AAB A
ABA A
ABB B
BAA A
BAB B
BBA B
BBB B - J1, J2, J3
Table 12: Players: non-fix, non-fix, non-fix
In an accompanying paper on higher-order decision theory [6] we show
that quantifiers and selection functions provide a powerful tool to unify sev-
eral approaches ranging from rational choice theory to behavioral alterna-
tives. The game context, introduced in this paper, basically summarises the
game theoretic situation of each player as a decision problem. Hence, it is
possible to consider behavioral alternatives such as heuristics not only in de-
cision problems but they can be directly implemented in strategic situations
as well.
In this paper we have restricted ourselves to show that a representation
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with higher-order functions does exist. A big advantage of our approach we
have not really touched here is compositionality. With payoffs it may be
necessary to compute outcomes by hand. This is cumbersome, error prone,
and slow. In particular, when one considers a change in the model such
as adding another player. In contrast, selection functions can be used al-
gebraically. There are clearly defined ways to extend games without the
need to change elements of the payoffs by hand. As the foundation of com-
puter science, computability theory and functional programming languages,
this compositionality is naturally built in higher-order functions. We believe
this will be particularly helpful when analysing arbitrarily complicated and
irregular games.
The fact that there is very close connection to computation is another
advantage of this framework. Our game representations are directly repre-
sentable as code. In fact, we have taken advantage of this possibility and
implemented a prototype in order to automatically compute the equilibria of
the games in this paper.
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